Framing Access to Justice: beyond Perceived Justice for Individuals by Blasi, Gary
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-2009
Framing Access to Justice: beyond Perceived Justice
for Individuals
Gary Blasi
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: beyond Perceived Justice for Individuals, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 913 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol42/iss4/3




The current vision of access to justice is framed too narrowly. While
our system is still far from providing a right to counsel in individual
civil matters, we should aim toward a goal beyond providing counsel
for individuals with already well-defined legal disputes. Access to
justice has come to be framed rather narrowly as access of an
individual to a lawyer, or some form of assistance purported to be at
least a partial substitute, to help deal with a problem or dispute already
framed in legal terms. The notion of a "civil Gideon" adopts this
circumscribed perspective. But, access to justice should be framed to
include exploring legal solutions where they are not immediately
apparent, enabling collective and collaborative action when necessary,
and attending to not only perceptions of procedural justice but also to
outcomes. Two slum housing eviction cases illustrate affirmative
representation and the contours of claims framing. A broader framing
of access to justice may lead to greater equality, effectiveness, and
efficiency.
The arc of history is long, but it curves towards justice.
-Reinhold Niebuhr'
Keep your eyes on the prize. Hold on.
-African American Spiritual2
Be careful if you don't know where you're going in life,
because you might not get there.
-Yogi Berra3
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
1. ANDREI CHERNY, THE NEXT DEAL: THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC LIFE IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 208 (2001).
2. ROBERT PARRIS MOSES, Keep Your Eyes on the Prize, on SING FOR FREEDOM: THE
STORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT THROUGH ITS SONGS (Smithsonian Folkways
Recordings 1990), available at http://www.folkways.si.edu/trackdetail.aspx?itemid=27604.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Experience and social science tell us that the way we frame
issues largely determines how we make decisions about them. In this
Article, I write about the framing of "access to justice." The naive
layperson might think these three words convey the possibility of
achieving a just result, a result achieved through a fair process, or
more likely both; such an impression is not terribly far from the
mark. But over the years, as people with particular perspectives and
social situations have labored to define and operationalize the
concept, access to justice has come to be framed rather narrowly into
four components: (1) access of (2) an individual (3) to a lawyer, or
some form of assistance purported to be at least a partial substitute,
(4) to help deal with a problem or dispute already framed in legal
terms. Certainly, the notion of a "civil Gideon"4 (or a right to
counsel in civil matters), which now animates a great deal of reform
efforts, adopts this circumscribed perspective. We are so far from
realizing such a vision that one hesitates to suggest, as I do here, that
the current vision is too narrow. I will argue, however, that a broader
vision may lead to more justice, even within the same resource
constraints. This refraining of access to justice would encompass not
only problems that have ripened into clear legal controversies but
also those that might do so with the benefit of legal assistance. It
would extend to a right to assistance in overcoming collective action
problems and in asserting group claims where doing so is either
necessary or efficient. Finally, it would include a right to effective
assistance in which effectiveness is measured, at least in part, by the
results achieved.
Given how distant we are from achieving far more limited goals,
these propositions may seem naive or of purely philosophical
interest. But if we begin with the limited ambition of providing
counsel (or purported alternatives) only in individual, well-defined
legal disputes, then that is as far as we are likely to get for reasons
perhaps best captured in the quotations with which I introduced this
3. Yogi Berra, Live Your Life Like Every Day Is Opening Day, Address at Saint Louis
University Commencement Ceremony (May 19, 2007), available at http://www.slu.edu/pr/
yogi-quote.wav.
4. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal
defendants have a fundamental right to counsel at trial and, in turn, providing the foundation for
this term).
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Article. 5 Perhaps more importantly for the short term, in expanding
services at that level we may unintentionally reduce the overall level
of access to justice. There are already powerful forces driving the
provision of legal services toward isolated, individual, and limited
assistance. Funders, both government and private, often insist on
quantitative indications of service delivery that push service delivery
models toward providing limited assistance to large numbers of
people. There are powerful political and ideological forces that are
extremely hostile to the provision of legal assistance that might
challenge entrenched injustice on a wider scale. For example,
although the political winds have shifted somewhat since the federal
government barred legal services organizations from filing class
actions,6 lobbying, 7 or organizing,8 such limitations remain, as do the
interests that motivated them. It is likely that the resources to
provide services on a larger scale will diminish, given limited
resources and greater pressure to increase the delivery of individual
legal services. In effect, there may be a Gresham's law9 for legal
services, as more extensive (and expensive) legal services lose to
high-volume, limited assistance service providers in the competition
for resources. 10 I argue in this Article that this result will impede
important goals of equality, effectiveness, and efficiency.
I introduce the argument through the lens of a rather routine
eviction case that had a somewhat exceptional trajectory and
compare that trajectory to some alternatives.
5. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
6. 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2008).
7. Id. § 1612.3. Section 1612.4 prohibits grassroots lobbying.
8. Id. § 1612.9 forbids any recipient of federal legal services funds "to initiate the
formation, or to act as an organizer, of any association, federation, labor union, coalition,
network, alliance, or any similar entity." Section 1612.7(a) prohibits legal aid lawyers from
participating in conventional direct action events ("public demonstration, picketing, boycott, or
strike"), except in relation to the lawyer's own employment.
9. Gresham's law is the principle, ascribed to Sir Thomas Gresham, founder of Britain's
Royal Exchange, that "bad money drives out good money." 2 J. SHIELD NICHOLSON, PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 113 (1897) (emphasis omitted).
10. See, e.g., Charles B. Parselle, State's Pro Bono Setup Redefines "Temporary," L.A.
DAILY J., Feb. 18, 2005 (applying Gresham's law to pro bono mediation services).
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A. The Tenant Mr. Quail
Consider the circumstances of David Quail." Mr. Quail was
both extremely poor and mentally disabled, subsisting on a mental-
disability pension. 12 When his landlord refused to repair some
serious problems in his small apartment, he refused to pay the rent,
which was his right under California law. "3 Predictably, his landlord
served him with a notice and a subsequent summons and complaint
for unlawful detainer.
Mr. Quail appeared at his eviction trial but was unable to present
a coherent case. He pleaded with the trial judge to help him find a
lawyer. The trial judge responded that he lacked the authority to do
so. Mr. Quail lost at trial but managed to file a notice of appeal. 14
Facing eviction and possible homelessness, Mr. Quail filed a
"lengthy, rambling, disjointed, confusing handwritten series of
petitions" with the California Court of Appeal, complaining about
procedural irregularities and asking for the help of a lawyer. '" The
court of appeal stayed his eviction and reviewed procedural
irregularities in his case, finding that "the settlement and
engrossment of the settled statement on appeal herein was not
properly carried out" and "the engrossed settled statement does not
contain the trial judge's certification that the statement accurately
and truly reflects the oral proceedings." 16 The court also issued a
writ giving Mr. Quail twenty days "to serve and file a condensed
statement of the oral proceedings pursuant to rule 127(a) of the
California Rules of Court, and... thereafter to proceed to settle the
statement in conformity with the provisions of said rule 127." 17 One
11. Quail was the petitioner in Quail v. Municipal Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Ct. App.
1985). As a lawyer at the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, I helped prepare an amicus
curiae brief to the California Supreme Court seeking a review of the court of appeal's decision
denying Quail's petition for appointment of counsel. Statements regarding Mr. Quail's
circumstances and the proceedings in the trial court, to the extent they do not appear in the
opinion of the California Court of Appeal, are based on my memory of the record. Three justices
of the California Supreme Court voted to grant review, one shy of the four needed. Quail v. Mun.
Court, 171 Cal. App. 3d 572, 593 (Ct. App. 1985).
12. Quail, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
13. See generally Green v. Super. Ct., 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974) (recognizing the common
law implied warranty of habitability for residential leases in California).
14. Quail, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
15. Id. at 364 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
16. Id. at 363 (majority opinion).
17. Id.
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wonders what Mr. Quail might have made of this majority opinion. I
will wager that none of my students and very few of my colleagues
at the UCLA School of Law know what an "engrossed settled
statement" is, or how to "settle a statement" under the California
Rules of Court. The court of appeal's decision must have mystified
Mr. Quail even more than what had happened to him in the trial
court.
The case would have gone unnoticed had the three-page
decision of the court of appeal been unanimous. The majority
opinion was followed, however, by a masterful twelve-page dissent
by Justice Earl Johnson, " now retired but still one of the country's
leading advocates for access to counsel in civil cases. " Justice
Johnson argued that Mr. Quail was entitled to appointed counsel both
on account of his mental disability and as a general matter of civil
justice:
It is now some seven centuries since the barons of England
extracted the Magna Carta from King John, including the
pledge: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or
delay, right or justice." It is nearly five centuries since
King Henry VII guaranteed poor Englishmen the right to
free counsel in civil cases. And it is nearly seventy years
since our own California Supreme Court reminded us,
"[I]mperfect as was the ancient common law system, harsh
as it was in many of its methods and measures, it would
strike one with surprise to be credibly informed that the
common law courts . . . shut their doors upon . . . poor
suitors . . . . Even greater would be the reproach to the
system of jurisprudence of the state of California if it could
be truly declared that in this twentieth century,... it had
said the same thing .... "
It is far too late in the twentieth century, far too late in
the history of our state for California courts to effectively
18. Id. at 364-75 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Johnson concurred as to
the issuance of the peremptory writ of mandate, but he dissented as to the majority's cursory
denial of Mr. Quail's requests for appointment of counsel. Id. at 364.
19. Justice Johnson's remarkable career also included serving as the deputy director of the
first federally funded legal services effort in the United States. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE
AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 72
(1978). His work continues in his present role as co-chair of the Right to Counsel Committee of
the California Commission on Access to Justice, of which I am also a member.
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"shut their doors upon ... poor suitors" by denying them
the assistance of counsel in civil litigation. 20
There has been an explosive growth of chronic homelessness
among people with serious mental disabilities in the quarter century
since David Quail was evicted. Moreover, it is far less expensive to
maintain such individuals in supportive housing than to respond to
them on the streets. 21 Given these facts, one might think that Justice
Johnson's plea might have been heard by now, at least for people
with severe mental disabilities at risk of losing, through our "justice
system," the essential means to survive. Sadly, however, even in
such extreme cases, Justice Johnson's goal is still out of reach.
On the other hand, there appears to be more support for a right
to counsel in cases like Mr. Quail's than in most others. This is
partly a matter of framing. Not long ago, someone asked me what I
thought would be the strongest case in which to litigate a right to
counsel. I responded, "A case involving someone like David Quail."
First, Mr. Quail's legal problem was not of his making. Until his
landlord sued him, he only had a housing problem. 22 It was the filing
and service of the unlawful detainer action that converted his housing
problem into a legal problem. 23 Mr. Quail had no alternative but to
respond. Second, Mr. Quail was indigent and unable to obtain
counsel solely as a result of his poverty, which was, in turn, a result
of his disability.24 Third, his disability interfered with his ability to
proceed pro se, 25 which highlights one of the deficiencies of limited
and self-help approaches. Finally, the stake in Mr. Quail's case was
not some luxury or trifle, but it was an issue of whether he would
have shelter and a home,26 something viewed as a human necessity in
every culture. Particularly in a culture in which agency is generally
20. Quail, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted).
21. Dennis P. Culhane et al., Accountability, Cost-Effectiveness, and Program Performance:
Progress Since 1998, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HOMELESSNESS RESEARCH 12-11 to 12-14
(2007), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1021 &context--dennis-
culhane.
22. See Quail, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
23. See id. at 361-62.
24. Id. at 364 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting).
25. See id.
26. Id.
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attributed to individuals, 27 Mr. Quail had a sympathetic case.28 Yet,
the trial court and the California Court of Appeal rejected his plea for
legal assistance. 29 Three members of the then very liberal California
Supreme Court voted to review the case, but they were one short of
the necessary four votes.3" The burgeoning right to counsel
movement may yet lead to a reversal of this outcome, through either
a court decision or legislation. ",
If that should come to pass, shall we then declare victory and the
arrival of true access to justice? Plainly, even a right to counsel
restricted to individuals with limited capacity or cases involving
critical human needs would be a major step forward. Such a system,
however, would still leave the great majority of poor members of the
community with a very limited version of access to justice-a
version where access would be provided by overwhelmed legal
services lawyers or an array of limited legal service providers,
including the current system of self-help centers. I have written
elsewhere that unless we care only about perceptions (some would
say illusions) of access to justice, we need to attend closely to
whether self-help and other next-best systems of providing legal
assistance actually deliver equal legal service, as measured by what
matters most to clients: the outcomes they produce.32 And here, the
evidence that self-help and other next-best systems actually deliver
equal access to justice is not very promising.33 This is not a new
point and not one I want to belabor here. Rather, I want to suggest
27. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to Perceptions of
the Causes of Homelessness, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 207, 212-13 (2000) (providing a brief
introduction to the evidence of "attributional" beliefs about homelessness).
28. Sympathy toward people with disabilities is not necessarily accompanied by more
positive attitudes. See Dale Larson, Unconsciously Regarded as Disabled: Implicit Bias and the
Regarded-As Prong of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 UCLA L. REv. 451, 475-79
(2008) (citing studies that show implicit biases against people with disabilities).
29. Quail, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
30. Quail v. Mun. Court, 171 Cal. App. 3d 572, 593 (Ct. App. 1985).
31. The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law provides the valuable service of
compiling and distributing developments regarding "civil Gideon" around the United States and
other countries. These developments are available at Brennan Center for Justice,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resources/elerts-legalservices/category/civil-gideon/ (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009).
32. Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 865, 870,
875-77 (2004) [hereinafter Blasi, How Much Access?].
33. See Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in
New York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. & SOC'Y REV. 419,
426-29 (2001).
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the value of an alternative vision--one that not only conceives of
access to justice in the resolution of individual disputes already
defined in legal terms, but one that also locates those disputes within
a broader context and responds to them there. In other words,
securing a right to counsel for individuals in circumstances like those
faced by David Quail is absolutely essential, but it is not sufficient to
achieve reasonable goals of equal access, effectiveness, and
efficiency. To further illustrate this point, I introduce another slum
housing case.
B. Ms. Carbajal and the Main Street Tenants
As a beginning legal services lawyer in 1978, I knew that many
of my clients reported having problems of the kinds that caused
David Quail to withhold his rent: lack of heat and hot water,
cockroach and rat infestations, broken windows and doors, cracked
walls, and peeling paint. One of those clients was Celia Carbajal, an
immigrant mother and garment worker from El Salvador who lived
in a sixty-unit building on Main Street, a mile south of downtown
Los Angeles and only one block from my office. 34 In order to try to
pressure the landlord, she gave the manager a list of serious problems
in her apartment and in the building, along with a note that she would
not pay rent until they were repaired. Shortly thereafter, she
appeared on my intake day with an eviction notice. I had represented
scores of tenants before, particularly in eviction cases, and I knew
what to do. I had visited their homes, taken pictures, and helped
them collect "Roach Motels" (many evidencing signs of "No
Vacancy") along with the proceeds of mouse and rat traps (these
were useful for settlement purposes but not popular with court clerks
who might be called to mark them as trial exhibits). At the time, I
thought that each of my clients received excellent representation (as
a matter of fact and not just ego) and real access to justice, even
when we lost at trial. Although I worked with some tenant
organizations, I generally framed my job as helping one family at a
34. The building was located at 1821-1839 South Main Street in Los Angeles. Through the
wonders of the "street view" feature of Google Maps, readers can see recent images of the now-
renovated building (actually two contiguous buildings). Google Maps, http://maps.google.com
(search for "1821-1839 S. Main Street, Los Angeles, CA"; then follow "Street view" hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
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time, the family having effectively been selected for my help by a
landlord through the service of an eviction notice.
I also knew Ms. Carbajal's landlord, Dr. Milton Avol. I had
represented another one of his tenants when he tried to evict her with
no notice at all.35 Dr. Avol was a Beverly Hills neurosurgeon with a
lucrative side business as a slumlord, owning several large apartment
buildings in the poorest neighborhoods of Los Angeles. 36 I had not
visited Ms. Carbajal's building, however, until I accompanied her to
see her apartment and take photographs. Perhaps partly because I
knew her landlord, I grew increasingly angry with what I saw:
children playing in darkened hallways (light bulbs cost money),
stairwells with broken railings, inoperable fire escapes and fire
hoses, heaters that had not worked in years, leaky plumbing, fresh
evidence of vermin, and other violations of basic housing and health
codes. And the rent for Ms. Carbajal's unit was not cheap; on a per-
square-foot basis, it was more expensive than my own house.
I went back to the office determined to do more than just defend
Ms. Carbajal's eviction. After meeting with the senior lawyers in the
office, my colleague Barbara Blanco37 and I decided we would sue
Dr. Avol on behalf of all the building's tenants who would agree to
representation, seeking both injunctive relief and damages under
every legal theory possible.3 Doing this for Ms. Carbajal alone
35. Dr. Avol sought to evict our client Sara Arrieta based on a notice and later default
judgment against her boyfriend, who had long departed before the notice was served. Under the
policies of the Los Angeles County Marshal at the time, if a landlord obtained a judgment against
any tenant in a unit, all tenants of the unit would be evicted. Arrieta v. Mahon, 644 P.2d 1249,
1250-51 (Cal. 1982). We sued the Marshal to force his office to change that policy. The trial
court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to that effect, which was eventually affirmed by a
unanimous California Supreme Court. Id. at 1250-51, 1257.
36. One of Dr. Avol's other claims to fame was his status as the first slumlord sentenced to
spend time either in jail or in one of his own buildings. People v. Avol, 238 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1987) (affirming the sentence); see also House Arrest for a Slumlord,
TIME, July 1, 1985, at 29; Robert Schwartz, Make Way for Landlord, For Tenants, It's Not a
Sentence, It's Home, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1985, at 1. The episode later found its way, as all
good stories in Los Angeles do, onto television in an episode of the drama L.A. Law. RANDALL
BARTLETr, THE CRISIS OF AMERICA'S CITIES 130-31 (1998).
37. Barbara Blanco is currently a Clinical Professor of Law and Faculty Clinical Director at
Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
38. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Damages, Carbajal v. Avol, No.
C288362 (L.A. Super. Ct. June 18, 1979). Fortunately for us, a group of students at U.C.
Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall) developed a model complaint, based on both common law
and statutory theories, which had never been tried in court as far as we knew. The model
complaint was developed for a handbook on housing law prepared by the National Housing Law
Project, and it was incorporated as an appendix to MYRON MOSKOVITZ ET AL., CALIFORNIA
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would not have made sense because of our limited resources and
because the other tenants in the building shared virtually all of Ms.
Carbajal's problems. The common areas were obviously, well,
common. The lack of heat resulted from a single decrepit furnace
boiler in the basement. The cockroaches lived in every interstice of
the building; cleared from one room, they would quickly return. Ms.
Carbajal's problem required a collective solution, so we enlisted the
help of a tenant organization, Inquilinos Unidos, to help us work
with the tenants.
At the hearing on the preliminary injunction, Dr. Avol's lawyer
offered to settle the case. Under the terms of the stipulated
judgment, an injunction would issue requiring Dr. Avol to fix a
detailed list of problems that we would specify, and Dr. Avol would
pay our clients a few thousand dollars in general damages. The
repairs were made, and heaters were installed. A stipulated judgment
for a few thousand dollars in damages was entered. Although we
had to have the sheriff threaten to tow away the Oldsmobile
belonging to Dr. Avol's wife in order to collect the money judgment,
Dr. Avol began to make repairs. " Our clients were satisfied, as were
we, that some justice had been done.
Unfortunately, the story of the Main Street building does not end
there. Although repairs were made as the result of our settlement,
Dr. Avol maintained the same business model of "milking"4 the
building, and the slum conditions returned within a few years. Once
again, legal services lawyers (joined this time by a private litigation
firm) sued Dr. Avol on behalf of the tenants, almost all of whom
were new since the first case. And once again, the tenants secured an
injunction requiring repairs. This time, however, they collected
much more money in damages from Dr. Avol (or rather his insurers),
and the plaintiffs' lawyers got more than one million dollars in
EVICTION DEFENSE MANUAL (1971). Interview with Myron Moskovitz, Professor of Law,
Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, Cal. (May 26, 1995) (on file with author).
39. Having met Dr. and Mrs. Avol at a deposition, we surmised that the prospect of having a
sheriff tow away Mrs. Avol's Oldsmobile, in full view of her Beverly Hills neighbors, would get
her attention and, consequently, Dr. Avol's attention.
40. For an explanation of the term and process, see Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the
Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: "'Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 485,486-90 (1987).
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attorneys' fees. 4 The story after that gets more complicated, but in
essence, the same building was the subject of yet another round of
complicated litigation, resulting in the appointment of a receiver and
the eventual removal of Dr. Avol as the owner. About twenty years
elapsed between the first case and the last.
Now the building, which lies on the border of a gentrifying
downtown Los Angeles, has been rehabilitated once again by another
owner, and the units are being marketed as "affordable luxury in the
heart of downtown Los Angeles."4 2  Rents have risen beyond the
reach of garment workers like Ms. Carbajal.43 Ms. Carbajal and her
neighbors, both in the building and in the neighborhood, might have
benefited from organizing and legal assistance well beyond what
they received. For example, the use of government funds that are
ostensibly intended to benefit low-income people has enabled much
of the gentrification of the area. 4 4 Litigation, organizing, and other
modes of advocacy might have reduced or ameliorated the
gentrification pressure that led to their eventual displacement from
the neighborhood. Advocacy also might have focused on pressuring
the responsible government agencies to take a more active and
effective role. Put another way, although expanding the framing of
Ms. Carbajal's problem as one that she shared with the other tenants
was a positive step, the framing never really went beyond the actual
building in which she lived. Doing so, however, might have
ultimately been more effective, a more efficient use of resources, and
a greater contribution to equality of access to adjudicative systems.
41. Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, Castaneda v. Avol, No. C561663 (L.A.
Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 1985). The private firms of Litt & Stormer and Margolis, McTernan, Scope
& Epstein represented the tenants on their damages case, and the Legal Aid Foundation of Los
Angeles represented them for injunctive relief. Id. at 1, 155; see also Gina Lobaco, Tenants Take
the Offensive: Lawyers Sue Landlords on Contingency-Fee Basis in California, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1991, at 40, 40-41.
42. Classifieds, DAILY TROJAN, June 8, 2005, at 8, available at http://media.college
publisher.com/media/paper679/documents/uvtjl954.pdf.
43. According to the Downtown Center Business Improvement District ("DCBID"), the
rental prices for the units at 1821-1839 S. Main Street range from $700 to $1,200. DOWNTOWN
CENTER Los ANGELES BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES
EXISTING HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS (2008), available at http://downtownla.com/frame.asp?main
Page=pdfs/econ residential/ExistingHousingDevelopmentsQ408.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Unlawfully Displaced Alexandria Residents Relocated, LEGAL AID
FOUNDATION OF LOS ANGELES, May 27, 2008, http://www.lafla.org/news/viewNews.asp?id=364
(describing how developers displaced low-income tenants from the Alexandria Hotel in
downtown Los Angeles even though the developers received public funds intended to benefit the
low-income tenants).
Summer 2009]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 42:913
This leads us to the questions at hand. First, under a definition
of "access to justice" to which we should reasonably aspire, would
Ms. Carbajal and her neighbors be entitled to the kind of collective,
affirmative representation that we-legal aid lawyers and tenant
organizers-provided? Under most current conceptions, the answer
is no. To begin with, the tenants did not have a legal problem that
might be addressed by litigation until lawyers combined their
circumstances with untested legal theories and produced a complaint.
As I explain in the next section, even the most forward-leaning
current discourse regarding a right to counsel in civil matters frames
the issue in terms of individuals or families rather than buildings,
neighborhoods, or classes of similarly situated people. And, of
course, when Ms. Carbajal came to our office, she had the same
framing: she had a legal notice and, therefore, a legal problem, but it
was relevant only to her and her family. It was only through
discussion, meetings, organizing, and considerable effort by our
office and our organizer partners that the tenants and lawyers came
to frame Ms. Carbajal's problem as a common or group legal
problem that was capable of an affirmative, collaborative, and
collective solution.
Furthermore, under a reasonable construction of access to
justice, would Ms. Carbajal and other poor tenants in her
neighborhood have access to assistance in responding to the failures
of the housing code enforcement system or the misuse of
redevelopment funds? As I note below, one will find few arguments
to that effect in the current discourse about access to justice. I will
argue for such access, however, at least as a matter of first principles.
In a world of finite resources, there will always be tradeoffs between
the time spent assisting individuals like Mr. Quail or Ms. Carbajal
with their individually framed problems and time spent dealing with
problems common to the tenants in a building or the residents in a
neighborhood. Those tradeoffs deserve careful considerations that
do not prejudge an outcome. But, by framing access to justice in
individual terms and with regard to problems already defined as
"legal," we do not merely prejudge the outcome; we preempt the
discussion.
Here, I argue that we should begin with a wider framing of
access to justice-for at least some populations and some kinds of
problems-that would encompass a right to assistance to (1) claims
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making, which would include assistance not only with problems that
have ripened into clear legal controversies but also with those that
might do so with the benefit of legal assistance; (2) organizing and
coordination, which would include legal or organizing assistance to
overcome collective action problems and to assert group claims,
where doing so is either necessary or demonstrably more efficient or
effective; and (3) monitoring and enforcement, which would include
legal and investigative assistance to monitor and enforce compliance
with equitable relief obtained through litigation or organizational or
institutional change obtained by other means.
I examine several arguments for such a framing, even as
advocates seek less ambitious reform. Chief among these is an
argument for equality, given that these forms of legally assisted
problem solving are routinely available to more socially advantaged
groups. I also argue that the more comprehensive framing can also
result in greater effectiveness, improved resource efficiency, and
improved compliance with the law and a respect for legal norms.
These arguments are predicated on the following assumptions: access
to justice must mean more than individualized access to perceived or
procedural justice, and it should be measured by outcomes as well as
by processes and appearances.
II. THE "CIVIL GIDEON" MOVEMENT AND THE INDIVIDUALIZED,
LEGALIZED FRAMING OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Some may argue that I am wrestling with a straw opponent.
Certainly, there is nothing new in the idea that legal services for the
poor should at least go beyond a narrow focus on individualized
representation with regard to clear legal claims.45 The never-ending
debate about the relative merits of providing assistance in "service"
versus "impact" cases in legal aid circles is, well, never ending. But
these issues-and the important considerations of the tradeoffs they
45. The founders of the modem version of legal services saw the effort as one of social
change, not merely access to dispute resolution. See Edward V. Sparer, The New Legal Aid as an
Instrument of Social Change, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 57, 60 (1965); see also MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960-1973, at 22-39 (1993)
(discussing Sparer's role in the welfare rights movement). Stephen Wexler argued that
organizing was essential to effective poverty law practice. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for
Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970). Gary Bellow advocated using individual
representation strategically through a "focused case" approach. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions
into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, NLADA BRIEFCASE, Aug. 1977, at 106, 121-22,
available at http://www.garybellow.org/garywords/solutions.html.
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invoke-seem strangely absent from current mainstream discussions
about increasing access to justice. The most notable description of
that goal is found in the resolution unanimously adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in August 2006:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges
federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal
counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income
persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings
where basic human needs are at stake, such as those
involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody
as determined by each jurisdiction. 46
The report accompanying the recommended resolution, which
was supported by a wide swath of the organized bar, noted that the
resolution was consistent with fundamental principles of equal access
long supported by the ABA, early English common law, many state
constitutions, and practices in European jurisdictions.4 7 The report
also argued that there were sound policy reasons to afford counsel to
litigants now compelled to proceed pro se. 48 All of the examples
provided involved individuals. 49 The right to counsel advocated was
also limited to litigative contexts, in either judicial or quasi-judicial
forums: "The right defined in this resolution focuses on
representation in adversarial proceedings; it does not propose a
generalized right to legal advice or to legal assistance unrelated to
litigation in such forums."50
Moreover, in expanding on the meaning of "basic human
needs," the individual framing is made explicit, as exemplified by the
definitions of "shelter" and "sustenance":
* "Shelter" includes a person or family's access to or
ability to remain in an apartment or house, and the
habitability of that shelter.
46. American Bar Association, House of Delegates Resolution 1 12A (Aug. 7, 2006), http://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06AI 12A.pdf.
47. HOWARD H. DANA, JR., TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, RESOLUTION ON
CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 2, 6-7 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
downloads/06A 112A.pdf.
48. Id. at 9-10.
49. Id. at 9-12.
50. Id. at 12.
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* "Sustenance" includes a person or family's sources of
income whether derived from employment,
government monetary payments or "in kind" benefits
(e.g., food stamps). Typical legal proceedings
involving this basic human need include denials of or
termination of government payments or benefits, or
low-wage workers' wage or employment disputes
where counsel is not realistically available through
market forces. 51
The resolution approved by the ABA House of Delegates was,
of course, the product of an enormous amount of work by talented
and principled people. The limited framing of access to justice for
individuals-and families where the situation requires-in the
context of adversarial proceedings, regarding matters already framed
in legal terms, certainly represents the considered judgments of
hundreds of honorable people. This same framing dominates the
discussion of the issue beyond the ABA. For example, the Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law52 has
played an important facilitative role in those discussions. The
opening words of a Brennan Center white paper-a brief but
thorough review of the topic-illustrate this individualized framing:
"Our nation's promise of 'equal justice for all' is among its proudest
traditions. American courts promise a forum for individuals to settle
disputes in a civil manner, under the rule of law." 53
Similarly, a recent summary and survey article on the topic in
Clearinghouse Review (the long-time journal of record for poverty
lawyers) touches on access to justice efforts around the country,
citing not only national efforts but also initiatives in eleven states. "
In every example, the effort is framed in terms of providing
representation or other forms of assistance to individuals in well-
formed legal controversies.55
51. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
52. Brennan Center for Justice, http://www.brennancenter.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
53. Id. at 1.
54. Paul Marvy, Advocacy for a Civil Right to Counsel: An Update, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 644 (2008), available at http://www.povertylaw.orgclearinghouse-review/issues/2008/
march-april-2008-clearinghouse-review/marvy. The examples were from Alaska, California,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington,
and Wisconsin. Id. at 644-48.
55. See id.
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One of those efforts is one in which I have been personally
involved, as a member of a task force established by the California
Commission on Access to Justice to draft a generic state statute that
might serve as a template for state legislation. 56 We prepared both a
State Basic Access Act57 and a more comprehensive State Equal
Justice Act. 58 The framing of the proposed guarantee is similar in
both model statutes. "Full legal representation" is defined at section
202 of the more comprehensive act as
the performance by a licensed legal professional of all
activities (such as investigation of facts, research of law,
preparation of pleadings, negotiations, appearance at pre-
trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings, preparation of
appellate briefs and appearance at appellate oral arguments)
that may be involved in representing a party in a court or
other tribunal in which by law or uniform practice parties
may not be represented by anyone other than licensed
members of the legal profession. "
That level of representation (as opposed to assistance from
nonlawyers or self-help assistance) would be guaranteed by the terms
of the State Equal Justice Act under the following circumstances:
Full public legal representation services shall be available
to a plaintiff only if a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
position, with the financial means to employ counsel, would
be likely to pursue the matter in light of the costs and
potential benefits. In making that determination it shall be
presumed that a reasonable person would be likely to
pursue matters involving any of the following: the sole
housing for the plaintiff or plaintiff's family; the
maintenance of plaintiffs present employment or
occupation; the plaintiffs current right or future right to
income maintenance, health benefits and other substantial
benefits from the federal, state, or local government;
56. See Clare Pastore, The California Model Statute Task Force, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
176 (2006) (describing the background of the effort), available at http://www.povertylaw.org/
clearinghouse-review/issues/2006/2006-july-aug/pastore.
57. STATE BASIC ACCESS ACT (Tentative Draft 2008), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/
c8d7c0be3accl33d7as8m6ii3yO.pdf.
58. STATE EQUAL JUSTICE ACT (Tentative Draft 2006), available at http://www.brennan
center.org/page/-/d/download-file_38656.pdf.
59. Id. § 202.
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custody and/or parental rights to children; and protection
from domestic violence. 60
The scenarios giving rise to a right to counsel are thus framed
entirely in terms of individuals or individual families, and with
reference to problems clearly defined as requiring the assistance of
lawyers."6 As a member of the task force that drafted these model
statutes, I can say that we did not really question the implicit
boundaries set by the framing we adopted at the outset, which we
inherited from the California Commission on Access to Justice. 62
Nor do I believe that, as a matter of tactics or strategy, we erred in
not doing so. I use the example here only as further evidence of the
narrow framing that we (and I) have sometimes imposed on the lofty
phrase "equal access to justice."
III. FRAMING A RIGHT TO AFFIRMATIVE
AND COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION
Certainly, there are prudential reasons for advocates of a right to
counsel in civil matters to adopt the stance of the resolution
unanimously approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August
2006. Even the report accompanying the resolution characterizes
those reasons as a "careful, incremental approach to making effective
access to justice a matter of right, starting with representation by
counsel in those categories of matters in which basic human needs
are at stake."63  However, primarily for the reasons embodied in
Yogi Berra's observation quoted in the beginning of this Article, we
should maintain a goal of providing the kind of representation we
were able to offer Ms. Carbajal and her neighbors thirty years ago,
60. Id. § 301.1 (emphasis added).
61. Lesser forms of assistance--"limited legal representation," "legal advice," "legal
assistance," and "non-lawyer representation"-are framed in similar terms, with the difference
being dictated by the rules of the forum or the criticality of the interest at issue. See id. §§ 302-
05.
62. See generally STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: FULFILLING THE
PROMISE OF ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA (1996), http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/
calbar-generic.jsp?cid=10176&id=1375 (setting forth the findings and recommendations that
spurred the establishment of the California Commission on Access to Justice).
63. DANA, supra note 47, at 12. For an example of how this approach might proceed, see
Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social Change, 15
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697, 717 (2006) (assessing the efforts to obtain a right to counsel
as requiring a broader social change strategy, but concluding that for strategic reasons the place to
begin is with individual representation in custody cases).
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which I will characterize here as "affirmative representation." A
right to affirmative representation should include a presumptive right
to assistance, by a lawyer or other competent person, in (1) claims
framing, that is, framing a problem affecting critical human needs in
terms cognizable by law; (2) legal representation--on both an
individual and a group basis-through all procedural means provided
by law, that incorporates group representation where it is either
required for effective relief or demonstrably superior to
individualized action, including assistance in overcoming collective
action problems where necessary; and (3) monitoring and enforcing
compliance when the legal representation results in injunctive or
other equitable relief operating infuturo.
By including the modifier "presumptive," I mean to suggest that
under any set of reasonable assumptions about resources, there will
be more need than can be met. ' How to allocate resources -who
should allocate them and what principles should apply-will always
be with us whether we frame access to justice in narrow or broad
terms. There are at least three reasons for not privileging individual-
level representation a priori, including the facts that (1) affirmative
representation is essential to address both actual and perceived
equality of access concerns; (2) affirmative representation and group
representation may, under many common circumstances, be more
effective than individualized, legalistic representation, or a necessary
complement to such representation; and (3) affirmative
representation may be more efficient than alternatives.
At the same time, there may be sound arguments, both practical
and principled, to limit affirmative representation to matters
implicating basic human needs, defined by the ABA resolution to
include "shelter, sustenance, safety, health and child custody."65
After all, there are limits to what we should expect of law, to the
extent that we regard law as distinct from politics. The equal
application of our laws, particularly for the benefit of the poor and
powerless, and in relation to their fundamental human needs, should
64. DANA, supra note 47, at 4-5 (discussing the "persistent shortage of legal aid resources"
and the "vast and continuing unmet need for the services of lawyers among those unable to afford
counsel"); see also STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 62 (follow "Executive Summary"
hyperlink) ("The need for civil legal assistance among low-income Californians far exceeds the
current level of resources provided through government and private charity. Today, the legal
needs of approximately three-quarters of all poor people are not being met at all.").
65. DANA, supra note 47, at 12.
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not be left to politics alone-at least not if we expect to remain a
nation of laws predicated on more than mere power.
IV. PROBLEM-SOLVING ASSISTANCE IN NAMING,
BLAMING, CLAIMING ... AND FRAMING
At most times, ordinary people do not understand their situations
in legal terms. Rather, people have problems and engage in a wide
range of problem-solving activity entirely without lawyers. 66 Along
with a number of others, I find it useful to think of what lawyers do
as problem solving. 67 Invariably, there are potential solutions to
problems that do not rely upon legal institutions; indeed, some of
them require circumventing those institutions. For example, the
tenants in the Main Street building might have picketed Dr. Avol's
house in Beverly Hills, drawing the attention of his wealthy
neighbors to the means by which Dr. Avol maintained his mansion.
Lawyers would have been useful but not necessary to such an effort.
One can imagine, and in moments of intense frustration I have
imagined, remedies that would be plainly illegal, beyond the pale for
any lawyer. 6 One social function of law, of course, is to provide
alternative, nonviolent means to solve problems. 69
Solving problems is a core function of lawyers. Legal problem
solving requires framing problems in legal terms. As Felstiner, Abel,
and Sarat point out: "Trouble, problems, personal and social
dislocation are everyday occurrences." 70 By contrast, legal disputes
are socially constructed through the process by which these troubles
come to be perceived as grievances, followed by claims with a
66. This point is best made in Gerald P. L6pez's article Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1984) (examining how human beings help each other solve problems in everyday life and how
this "lay lawyering" can help us to better understand lawyering).
67. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 323-30 (1995); e.g., Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 811 (1999).
68. A union organizer once explained his view of lawyers to students in one of my classes in
words to this effect: "I don't want lawyers to tell me what I can't do; I want them to get me out of
trouble after I do it."
69. See, e.g., SUSAN STEWART, CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A FOUNDATION GUIDE 14-16
(1998) ("[H]istorically the law developed as the first alternative to violent resolution of
disputes.").
70. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 631, 633
(1980-81).
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potential remedy. 7" Certainly, the tenants of the Main Street building
understood that Dr. Avol and his minion (there was only one) were
not providing heat in winter or responding to widespread infestations
of cockroaches and rats. But, there was no reason to expect those
tenants to know that those troubles might give rise to legal claims.
Indeed, such claims had existed only since 1974, when the California
Supreme Court found that every residential rental agreement contains
an implied warranty of habitability. 72
Lawyers do more, however, than just recognize that problems
may be conceived in legal terms. Lawyers also actively engage in
problem solving more broadly. Although Felstiner et al. offered a
brilliant exposition of the sequence of "naming, blaming, [and]
claiming, ' 73 their account did not reach the questions of which
possible claims might result from the process and with what
consequences. To address that question would have required a
fourth (but still rhyming) concept: framing. Within legal
scholarship, the best known example is the "framing effect" first
identified by Tversky and Kahneman-that is, the tendency of
people to prefer or to be persuaded by one interpretation of an
outcome over another that is logically equivalent. 74 Although not as
frequently addressed in legal scholarship, framing is a process and
phenomenon that has attracted a great deal of research and theorizing
in sociology and psychology, much of which traces the terminology,
if not the actual ideas, to Erving Goffman. 75 Goffman defined
frames as "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals "to
locate, perceive, identify, and label" aspects of the social world. 76
Sociologists explain that "frames help to render events or
occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience
71. Id. at 634-36.
72. Green v. Super. Ct., 517 P.2d 1168, 1176 (Cal. 1974).
73. Felstiner et al., supra note 70, at 631, 634-36.
74. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981).
75. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Review Essay, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94
CAL. L. REV. 907, 932-34 (2006) (using Goffman's concept of frameworks to discuss race and
racial stereotypes); David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and
Movement Participation, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 464, 464 (1986) (discussing adherent and constituent
mobilization by using Goffman's frame-analytic perspective to link social psychological and
resource mobilization views on movement participation).
76. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE 21 (1974).
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and guide action."77 Political psychologists and scholars of public
communication use the term in slightly different ways, but they
"agree that frames give meaning to key features of some topic or
problem."7" Most socially relevant frames also include indicia of
causation and responsibility. '9 The idea that the construction of
meaning is an active process is central to the concept of framing.80
The same information can be presented and understood in quite
different ways, often with dramatically different results." An
important lawyering capacity-one I emphasize in my own clinical
lawyering courses-is understanding the processes of framing and
the likely consequences of various frames.
Lawyers most often work with frames that are already extant in
the culture. In the case of Dr. Avol, we benefitted from the slumlord
frame that had come to exist in American culture since at least the
Progressive Era. 82 The slumlord stereotype carries with it notions of
exploitation and reckless indifference to the plight of tenants and
their children. " There is nothing intrinsic to the situation, however,
that compels this result. An alternative framing would portray Dr.
Avol as just another provider of cheap housing to people who can
afford nothing better as a result of poor wages in the garment
industry. Certainly, there is no equally negative frame or term
attached to those who sell inadequate food or low-quality clothing to
extremely poor people. Although it was relatively easy to cast Dr.
Avol as a slumlord (and tortfeasor), there were certainly other
77. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 611, 614 (2000). Sociologists of social
movements describe "framing" as the active process through which movement proponents are
"actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists,
and bystanders or observers." Id. at 613 (citation omitted).
78. Richard R. Lau & Mark Schlesinger, Policy Frames, Metaphorical Reasoning, and
Support for Public Policies, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 77, 77-80 (2005).
79. See generally Shanto Iyengar, How Citizens Think About National Issues: A Matter of
Responsibility, 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 878 (1989) (discussing how attributions of the causation of
social problems significantly affect attitudes toward those problems, even controlling for
partisanship, political leanings, and socioeconomic status).
80. Benford & Snow, supra note 77, at 614.
81. See Iyengar, supra note 79, at 897.
82. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF
FRUSTRATION 38-39, 42 (1978). A national housing-reform movement began in the early
twentieth century during the Progressive Era. Friedman writes, "It was convenient.., to assume
that landlords were a class of evil men, overcharging ignorant tenants and callous to the point of
criminality." Id. at 40.
83. See id. at 40, 42.
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choices for the role of villain, most of them unexplored at the time.
The point here is that exploring how best to frame problems and
attribute blame is something lawyers are trained to do.
A. Equality
The equality argument for including claims-framing assistance
within the rubric of guaranteeing access to justice is predicated on
the fact that businesses and upper-class people take the exploration
of alternatives as a given component of the services they expect from
lawyers. 84 Indeed, the upper classes are equipped with education and
the social position to do a good deal of framing and claims making
themselves, whether of individual or collective claims. 85
In terms of individual claims, studies of claiming rates-the
rates at which people frame their problems in legal terms and then
make claims through the legal system-vary according to many
different factors, of which social class is but one. 86 However, higher
social class is generally associated with higher rates of claims
making. 87 It is reasonable to expect that class differences in claims
making may be small with regard to the most common claims where
cultural knowledge of their availability is ubiquitous (e.g.,
automobile accidents) but also larger with less common claims (e.g.,
medical malpractice or discrimination). 88 One reason to expect class
differences in framing and making claims is the high correlation
between social class and education, including education about the
process of claims making and, at least in some cases, about the
process of framing itself. 89 If we intend the law to apply equally to
84. Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 L. & SOC'Y REV. 525, 551-52 (1981) (explaining that education and
income affect a person's ability or likelihood to bring a claim).
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., id.; see also Gary Blasi & John Jost, System Justification Theory: Implications
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1156-57 (2006).
87. Kevin D. Hart & Philip G. Peters, Cultures of Claiming: Local Variation in Malpractice
Claim Frequency, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 77, 91 (2008) (noting that median family income
is one of the strongest factors positively associated with claiming rates in medical malpractice
cases).
88. There is a remarkable lack of systematic data regarding claiming rates. Theodore
Eisenberg, The Need for a National Civil Justice Survey of Incidence and Claiming Behavior
(Nov. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1305385.
89. See generally SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND
CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES (1997) (discussing the high correlation between education and
socioeconomic status).
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all, then the application of the law cannot be dependent upon the
capacity of victims to understand whether they might have a legal
claim. A victim's understanding of whether he or she might have a
legal claim should be the predicate to exercising his or her choice to
make the claim or not.
In a few categories of cases, chiefly defined by whether they
will support an active plaintiffs' class action bar, both rich and poor
plaintiffs have no difficulty finding assistance in framing collective
claims. Outside this realm, however, framing collective legal claims
requires resources. There is a reason that there are far more lawyers
making a living representing homeowners' associations than lawyers
representing tenant organizations, albeit in some markets (e.g.,
Manhattan), there are enough upper-income tenants to make a fee-
based practice possible for lawyers who represent tenants. 9
Moreover, upper-class people and their lawyers can hire specialists
to assist them in deciding how to frame problems. 9' In short, equal
access to justice means equal access to the knowledge regarding the
various paths for achieving justice that run through the legal system.
B. Effectiveness
The effectiveness argument for claims-framing assistance flows
from the considerable evidence from many disciplines demonstrating
that the frames through decision makers understand problems can
have powerful impacts on outcomes. 92 The same event, such as the
death of a child in an apartment fire, can be framed in terms of
parental neglect, a slumlord's greed, or a deficient housing
inspection program. 93 Although all of these causal explanations
might be true, the one that becomes the dominant account will tightly
constrain the possible responses-or whether there is a response at
90. See, for example, the advertisements on the Tenant Net Web site, which focuses on New
York City and New York State. Tenant Net, http://www.tenant.net (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
91. Communications professionals, including those who work with nonprofit organizations,
do much of this work. For example, the aptly named FrameWorks Institute provides fee-based
"strategic frame analysis" to nonprofit organizations. FrameWorks Institute, http://www.frame
worksinstitute.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (follow "Strategic Frame Analysis" hyperlink).
92. See CHARLOTTE RYAN, PRIME TIME ACTIVISM: MEDIA STRATEGIES FOR GRASSROOTS
ORGANIZING 72-74 (1991) (explaining that the tenant-landlord frame, for example, can have a
moral appeal and influence the outcome).
93. See id. at 55-56.
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all. Of course, effectiveness can be measured from multiple
standpoints and interests.
Furthermore, a poverty lawyer representing the child's parent
might want to frame the problem as one of a failed housing
inspection program to advance what he or she sees as the interest of
other present and future clients, while the parent might insist on
going after the owner of the building. Undoubtedly, the preferences
of the parent-the client-should control. However, it seems
equally true that genuine access to justice would enable the parent to
have an informed discussion about the alternatives, rather than to
effectively predetermine those decisions through the institutional
design of delivery systems. It may well be that the grieving parent
will want to help prevent similar tragedies in the future if he or she
knows there are possible legal means to do so.
C. Efficiency
Claims-framing assistance may also lead to greater efficiency.
The availability of more efficient means of solving problems results
in a greater pool of problem-solving resources available to the class
of eligible persons. Although efficiency may not necessarily matter
to a client receiving free assistance for one case, efficiency would
preserve resources to assist the client with potential future problems.
In our sample case, framing the problem of the Main Street tenants in
terms of past landlord neglect turned out to be too narrow, at least in
practice. Thus framed, the most we could accomplish would be to
correct current problems and obtain some money damages for
current tenants, leaving future tenants (and our own clients who
remained Main Street tenants) to Dr. Avol's meager mercies. Also,
with this framing, the greater problems would remain; many of the
other apartments our clients could afford would be in almost as poor
a state as the Main Street building.
In the Avol case, we excluded from the frame those future
tenants whom Dr. Avol would harm if he maintained the same
business practices in the same building, even if he were forced for a
time to modify them. The result was that two different legal services
agencies were required to deal with Dr. Avol and his agents in the
same building in the later episodes I mentioned above. Moreover,
we framed Dr. Avol as uniquely evil-a particularly egregious
slumlord requiring special attention (that is, from us). Instead, he
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could have been framed as one of the many slumlords requiring the
attention of a well-functioning code enforcement system or a
slumlord taking advantage of a housing crisis brought on by failures
of housing policy at a government level. Due to our characterization,
we missed the opportunity to expand the frame, and hence the
resulting struggle, to get at more fundamental, systemic problems.
The result was that, over the years, we saw a lot more individual
tenants with severe habitability problems that were only framed in
legal terms because the tenants were defendants in eviction cases
filed against them when they they refused to pay the rent in an effort
to force their landlords to make necessary repairs. It would have
been completely wrong, of course, for us to have chosen the route of
affirmative litigation without a collaborative exploration of the
possibilities with our clients in the building. However, our services
were incomplete to the extent that collaborative exploration did not
reach issues of code enforcement and government policy. In
hindsight, our assistance was not quite the kind of affirmative
representation to which I would argue everyone should be entitled,
though it was much more than any individual tenant with a
habitability case could, empirically, expect at the time.
V. ASSISTANCE IN OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS: LAW AND ORGANIZING
Ms. Carbajal, the lead tenant plaintiff in the Avol case, did
receive legal assistance aimed at achieving justice not only for her
and her family in the short run, but also for all the tenants in the
building over the longer (if not long enough) term. She was a
remarkable woman, but long hours in a garment industry sweatshop
did not leave her much time to organize her fellow tenants. For that,
she needed some help, along with resources: a place to meet, help
with copying and distributing flyers, and so on. The decision to do
that organizing and to frame her problem as a collective problem was
a collaborative decision, made easier by the fact that the landlord
could not-as a matter of architecture and engineering-provide
some of the relief she needed, like heating and plumbing systems that
worked properly, to only one of sixty apartments. The organizing
itself was also a collaborative affair between Ms. Carbajal and a core
group of tenants, a tenant organization founded by a remarkable
retired union organizer, Dino Hirsch, and lawyers and paralegals
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from our office. Without those resources, the decision to frame Ms.
Carbajal's problems at the building level would have been little more
than an intellectual gesture and a matter of pleading. Under
California law, we might still have filed her case as a class action, at
least as to problems in the common areas and with building systems,
but putting together the proof in the case required the cooperation
and engagement of many more of the tenants in the building to
provide the necessary facts to establish liability or reach a settlement.
We were able to do more with what is called a "law and organizing"
approach."
However, in retrospect, perhaps we did not do enough. Among
the many reasons we did not explore more expansive framings of the
Main Street tenants' problem-the housing inspection system or
redevelopment policy-was that we were lawyers and not
organizers. There is some truth to the adage that lawyers are like
small boys with hammers, except that they see everything as a
possible lawsuit rather than as a nail. We only came to represent
nearly all the tenants in the building with the help of organizers.
Nevertheless, we stopped at the building level rather than going after
housing inspection policy issues. Our decision generally reflected, in
part, both our own limited framing and a narrower building-by-
building approach of the tenant organizations at the time, which had
not yet expanded to include neighborhood or city policy issues.
Deciding otherwise would probably have been-for both lawyers
and organizers-a matter of dialogic engagement with the Main
Street tenants as well as other organizations and tenants with similar
concerns. After that engagement, we might still have decided against
expanding the frame. However, ultimately the tenants were entitled
to have that discussion and to make an informed choice.
The potential relationship between lawyers and organizing is
not, of course, new to legal scholarship. Near the birth of modem
legal services, Stephen Wexler wrote:
Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor. If
poverty is stopped, it will be stopped by poor people. And
poor people can stop poverty only if they work at it
94. See generally Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal
Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REv. 937, 959-62 (2007) (describing
the law and organizing movement and how it encourages lawyers to work within the community
to seek nontraditional solutions to social injustice).
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together. The lawyer who wants to serve poor people must
put his skills to the task of helping poor people organize
themselves. "
Three colleagues at UCLA have contributed both to the
elaboration of this idea and to the critique of its implementation.
Most examples of Gerald L6pez's "rebellious lawyering" model
presuppose the existence of a contiguous community in which
organizing is or could be taking place. 96 Scott Cummings and Ingrid
Eagly have highlighted strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of a
law and organizing approach to client representation and more
generally to social justice work. 97 These issues are beyond my scope
here. My point is that true equal access to justice sometimes requires
access to organizing in at least the limited sense of solving those
collective action problems that make effective legal representation
possible. "
A. Equality
Generally speaking, people with more resources can use some of
those resources to overcome collective action problems, just as they
can hire people to help them consider alternative framings of
problems, including collective frames. Of course, framing a problem
in collective terms only raises the possibility of collaboration and
coordination. Realizing such a possibility requires that complex of
skills and activity called "organizing." Organizing does not
necessarily require organizers or money to pay them. It does require,
however, resources that poor and working people often lack,
including time beyond that spent trying to survive, communications
skills, and infrastructure (e-mail helps). By contrast, people with
more resources (and their lawyers) can either hire organizers, pay
dues to an existing organization, or use other means to deal with
collective action problems.
95. Wexler, supra note 45, at 1053.
96. See generally GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYER1NG: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (discussing his activist model of lawyering).
97. See generally Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001).
98. An article I coauthored with education scholars provides one current example. Jeannie
Oakes et al., Grassroots Organizing, Social Movements, and the Right to High-Quality
Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 339, 354 (2008).
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In some cases, poor people are represented by means that do not
depend on the charity of others. For example, there are low-wage
unions that represent janitors, hotel workers, long-term care workers,
and others-at least in some parts of the country. 99 Of course, in
some cases, low-income people may be well represented as to some
issues through religious organizations. The question in both of these
instances is, represented as to what? Most unions represent workers
only as to workplace issues, although there are some notable
exceptions. 100 There are religious organizations with strong social
justice leanings whose work in solving collective action problems
goes beyond "right to life" (as limited to fetuses) issues. Systems
providing full access to justice might take these alternative resources
into account in particular instances, but they will not assume their
existence where the facts are otherwise.
B. Effectiveness
As I discussed in the section on framing in Part IV above,
resolving some of Ms. Carbajal's habitability claims required going
beyond the walls of her apartment. Some of the problems in the
building resulted from building-level deficiencies. Absent a
collaborative effort with her neighbors, she had no real expectation
of getting heat in the building or hot water for more than two hours a
day. The costs of installing new heaters, boilers, and pipes in the
building dwarfed the maximum expected value of any damages she
and her family might recover. A profit-maximizing landlord would
offer in settlement, at most, something approaching what he might
lose at trial-the compensatory damages sustained by Ms. Carbajal
and her children. At trial, no judge would have made wide-ranging
and expensive injunctive orders that would primarily affect people
not before the court.
99. See RUTH MILKMAN, L.A. STORY: IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE
U.S. LABOR MOVEMENT 1, 25, 65-66 (2006).
100. With colleagues in the UCLA Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, I
am assisting SE1U Local 1877, the "Justice for Janitors" union in Los Angeles, working with and
for their members who are parents or guardians of children in public schools to address public
education issues. See also John S. Rogers & Veronica Terriquez, "More Justice": The Role of
Organized Labor in Educational Reform, 23 EDUC. POL'Y 216, 233 (2009). Union involvement
is much more common in issues that connect more directly with employment, such as health care.
Id. at 227.
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Effective problem solving requires dealing with problems at the
levels at which they are caused and then addressing those causes.
Dr. Avol had no special animus toward Ms. Carbajal, at least until
she sued him as lead plaintiff. To the contrary, he completely
disregarded all of the tenants in the building so long as their rent
checks were received by the first of the month. The problems in the
building were caused by his business plan: to "milk" the building for
cash rather than to treat it as an asset. Dr. Avol would be induced to
alter his business plan only by changing his financial calculations in
response to the threat of damages or by changing the nature of his
calculations based on the prospect of prosecution for defying the
court's injunctive orders. However, our initial settlement left him in
control of the building, and he was free to return to his original
business model once he determined those risks had declined. 101
Of course, not every potential legal problem is more effectively
addressed by collective means. That determination can only be made
in the very concrete contexts of particular problems affecting
individuals and the groups of which they are a part. My point is that
sometimes the most, and sometimes the only, effective solution
requires collective action, and overcoming the obstacles to collective
action often requires organizing as well as more extensive legal
work. In those instances, effective access to justice requires access
to those forms of assistance.
C. Efficiency
Collective action is not always more efficient, just as it is not
always more effective. 102 However, when it is effective, it is also
likely to be more efficient for both poor people and those who
provide the resources. From the perspective of some of the clients
involved, particularly those with a leadership or organizing role, a
101. Among the factors contributing to the declining risk to Dr. Avol was the fact that during
the Reagan-era cutbacks in legal services, the office near the Main Street building was closed. In
the second round of litigation against Dr. Avol, he gave up ownership of the building. However,
he self-financed the sale to another owner. Upon that owner's default, Dr. Avol was involuntarily
back in control, leading to the third round of litigation.
102. In legal services practice, we sometimes conducted a thought experiment called "the
Potato Test" before embarking on a major project. This test involved determining how many
resources it would take to achieve the result we expected, and then asking a representative (and
usually imaginary) group of clients, With these same resources, would you prefer that we take on
this project? Or would it be better if we spent the same money on potatoes or rice to distribute in
the community?
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collective approach may take more of their time than an
individualistic approach, just as most cases on behalf of individuals
consume less advocacy time than larger-scale endeavors. What
makes these endeavors efficient is that those resources result in the
provision of benefits to many more people. First, there are often
economies of scale of the kind that are the reason we have provisions
in every state and in Rule 23 for class actions. 103 Often, injustices
are significant but not significant enough to economically justify the
costs of remediating them through the mechanisms that the law
provides. They are remediable collectively or not at all. It would
have been cheaper for the Legal Aid Foundation to help Ms. Carbajal
move to another apartment than to bring an individual habitability
case on her behalf. However, even with the shortcomings that I have
described, we were able to obtain significant change in the lives of
both Ms. Carbajal and her neighbors at a much lower per-family
cost. Furthermore, although Ms. Carbajal and a handful of other
tenants spent a good deal of time in meetings and the like, the
average investment of time and accommodating inconveniences (like
responding to interrogatories) was also less for the average tenant in
comparison to the investment Ms. Carbajal would have had to make
in an individual tenant action, assuming we had been willing to bring
such an action.
Successful collective action problem solving can also be
efficient for one of the reasons that makes it effective: solving
problems at the source reduces the likelihood of their recurrence.
Given the subsequent history of the Main Street building, it is clear
that we were not as effective in this regard as we might have been. A
more experienced team " might have recognized that Dr. Avol
followed the same business model in his other buildings and would
likely return to that business model if he retained ownership.
Ousting Dr. Avol and replacing him with an ordinary landlord, as is
now sometimes done through the imposition of receiverships in slum
buildings, would have saved taxpayers and Dr. Avol's insurers a lot
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see generally ABA, SURVEY OF STATE CLASS ACTION LAW
(2007) (discussing the class action provisions in all fifty states), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/classactions/careview.html. There are, of course,
other justifications for class actions, including the avoidance of conflicting decisions.
104. Both Barbara Blanco and I were within thirty months of obtaining a license to practice
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of money. 105 However, doing that would have required the same
organization and help overcoming collective action problems that we
provided, and without such assistance the tenants would probably
have achieved no relief at all.
VI. ASSISTANCE BOTH IN SECURING REMEDIES AND
ENSURING THAT REMEDIES ARE MEANINGFUL AND LASTING
I have written elsewhere regarding the importance of paying
attention to outcomes in discussions of access to justice. 106 In that
work, I referred to the actual outcomes of particular dispute
resolution processes where access to justice is ostensibly provided. I
was inspired to write the piece upon discovering, in a small study
with students in one of my clinics, that in 151 eviction cases in which
a tenant had asserted habitability defenses, not a single tenant
prevailed unless he or she had a lawyer at trial, even though half of
the tenants had received help through self-help clinics. 107 Where
tenants had settled on the date of trial, these assisted tenants achieved
a result no better than they could expect from losing at trial. 108 Of
course, it is statistically possible that 151 out of 151 tenants deserved
to lose on the law and the facts. 09 However, an examination of the
housing code reports on the tenants' buildings suggested to us that a
good number of the tenants' claims were well founded. All of the
assisted but losing tenants received assistance from skilled
professionals in a setting that has since rapidly multiplied across the
country: the self-help clinic. 110 Did they achieve access to justice? It
105. See generally Ryan Howell, Note, Throw the "Bums " Out?: A Discussion of the Effects
of Historic Preservation Statutes on Low-Income Households Through the Process of Urban
Gentrification in Old Neighborhoods, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 541, 563 (2008) (discussing
how receiverships are used to revitalize impoverished neighborhoods by allowing neighbors and
city authorities to force the owners of slum buildings to either maintain their property or risk
losing it at a public auction).
106. See Blasi, How Much Access?, supra note 32, at 877.
107. Id. at 869.
108. Id.
109. More careful recent studies of the importance of lawyers in eviction cases have been
controlled for case quality by utilizing a randomized control group. Seron, supra note 33, at 423.
See also Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyer, Nonlawyer and Pro Se Representation and Trial and
Hearing Outcomes (June 30, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=913426).
110. Of course, other self-help clinics may achieve better results. But we should not be
surprised to learn that a few minutes of consultation, or even a much longer "trial preparation
clinic," is no substitute for three years of law school and many prior experiences in a courtroom.
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appears that they did not, if access to justice means having the
assistance necessary to achieve a result consistent with the facts and
the law applicable to a particular case. There may be some
independent value to providing a subjective sense (even if false) that
one has had a fair hearing, given the psychological (and
sociopolitical) value of perceived or procedural justice. "' One
doubts, however, that the general public believes that access to
justice should actually mean "access to the appearance or subjective
feeling of justice." Once we include outcomes as a part of the
measure of justice received, the principle applies to all kinds of
problems and assistance.
A. Equality
Procedural justice may be important, but most people and
businesses able to afford lawyers are looking for a result, not a
feeling. Poor people should expect the same from any system
promising access to justice. They are not as well situated, however,
to know whether they have received effective assistance and a fair
result that is consistent with the facts, the law, and the results
achieved by others with greater means. Knowing what most people
receive requires having information about more than one's own case
or problem. Repeat players-whether they are businesses with
frequent contacts with the legal system or legal services
organizations-have access to information (their own or that of the
legal system). This knowledge pertains not only to what happens in
a particular case but also to how cases can be compared with each
other. Legal services organizations also have access to the
information necessary to assess how their assistance affects
outcomes across large numbers of cases. If banks, insurance
companies, and large businesses can generate reports from this
information-sometimes to assess how much they have legally
extracted from poor people-then components of the justice system
for poor people should be able to generate results from their own
information as well.
Some legal services organizations maintain management
information systems containing outcome data, at least in individual
111. There is much literature on procedural justice. A good starting point is E. ALLAN LIND
& TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
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cases. This data is often much harder to maintain in larger-scale
matters that involve interests beyond money that may be more
important. A big piece of litigation resulting in a consent decree or a
major policy advocacy effort achieving a change in a statute may
seem impressive-until one learns that absolutely nothing has
changed on the ground and in the lives of the intended beneficiaries.
Implementing changes may require many years in addition to active
monitoring and engagement. Without monitoring, hard-won changes
in illegal behavior or policy may soon give way to backsliding,
retrenchment, and rights violations once thought to have been halted.
Businesses, organized labor, and organized interest groups pay
attention over time to matters that affect them. Public interest
lawyers do so more rarely. In the case of the Main Street building,
once our office closed and we lawyers moved several miles away, we
lost the natural organic monitoring we once had in the form of
tenants coming to our office with questions or complaints. The
building deteriorated dramatically before it again came to the
attention of legal services lawyers.
Sometimes, though, public interest lawyers do better. Between
2000 and 2004, I was privileged to work with the team of lawyers
and organizations that brought a statewide education class action
case, Williams v. California, 12 that challenged the horrendous
conditions and unequal resources available to approximately two
million public school students in California. 13 At the conclusion of
a successful settlement, the litigation team resolved to commit
significant resources to staffing a full-time monitoring effort that
would both assist in and assess the implementation of the settlement
agreement. 14 Having that capacity has been invaluable both in
working out complications with local school officials and in
responding proactively to violations that might have otherwise
accumulated until another lawsuit was required. In my experience,
112. No. 312236 (Super. Ct. S.F. filed May 17, 2000).
113. See Cal. Dep't of Educ., The Williams Case-An Explanation, http://www.cde.ca.gov/
eo/ce/wc/wmslawsuit.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2009); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUND. OF S. CAL. & PUB. ADVOCATES, INC., WILLIAMS V. CALIFORNIA: THE STATEWIDE IMPACT
OF Two YEARS OF IMPLEMENTATION 12 (2007), available at http://www.decentschools.org/
settlement/WilliamsReportWeb2007.pdf.
114. See Settlement Implementation Agreement, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Super.
Ct. S.F. dated Aug. 12, 2004), available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/eo/ce/wc/documents/
wmssettleagmt.pdf.
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institutionalizing monitoring and implementation functions is a rare
occurrence, generally seen only when it is court-ordered as part of
systematic injunctive relief.
Monitoring is rare, in part, because it requires resources, and the
work may seem less challenging or important than winning a case or
enacting a piece of legislation. The inattention to the longer term
and actual outcomes also flows from the schema and frame that most
lawyers have of a case. Cases tend to have a beginning, a middle,
and an end. During litigation, there is at least one person (the judge)
who is charged with enforcing procedural rules, which provide an
orderly sequence of processes to move toward the end of a case.
Whether a case is won is generally determined immediately at the
conclusion of a settlement, trial, or appeal.
By contrast, in the world outside of the legal framework, even
the Yogi Berra principle-"It ain't over 'til it's over" 5-may not
apply. Sometimes it is never "over." There is no final judgment rule
in the real, multidimensional world of problems affecting poor
people; there are no rules of procedure either suggesting or
constraining subsequent actions. The occasions for appropriately
declaring "mission accomplished" are, in both public interest law and
military affairs, fairly rare. It may be easier for public interest
lawyers to declare victories and not attend to monitoring results over
the long term, if only because in poverty and public interest law there
is seldom an analog to the company CEO, board of directors, or
shareholders for whom the results matter. If those providing access
to justice for the poor do not attend to results, then often no one
(other than some more sophisticated funders) will do so, unless we
conceive this work as integral to the provision of legal services.
B. Effectiveness
To say that one must attend to results to know whether one is
being effective seems an obvious tautology. But in the real worlds of
nonprofit and pro bono legal services with which I am familiar, some
organizations go on for years feeling effective without ever actually
examining the empirical facts to validate that feeling. It really is a
simple proposition, however. To paraphrase Samuel Goldwyn, an
unenforced judgment, statute, or settlement agreement is not worth
115. E.g., THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 58 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
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the paper it is written on. 16 Unless the point of the exercise is to
obtain words on paper, then effectiveness means achieving more
tangible results in the world in which clients live and communities
exist. And that means knowing the results.
C. Efficiency
Efficiency is also linked to results, which are the denominators
of any cost-benefit calculation. It would be foolish to suggest that
individual representation is always less efficient than affirmative or
collective representation, particularly when individual representation
is undertaken in a strategic way, in the model of Gary Bellow's
"focused case representation" approach. "' Nor do all, or even most,
individual problems lend themselves to affirmative, collaborative,
collective representation, although sometimes the threat of such
representation can be used to obtain better results for individuals. 18
On the other hand, it is often more efficient to address the source of a
problem than to deal seriatim with its individual consequences. This
is true in the case of claims too small to justify the transaction costs
of individual resolution, as in many consumer class actions. And it is
also true in the case of larger problems, in which a thousand hours of
lawyers' time and an infusion of organizing resources on behalf of a
community or a class may achieve better results for more people than
ten hours spent assisting each of five hundred--or even five
thousand-individuals.
VII. CONCLUSION
Any effective system for providing access to justice will
necessarily include providing assistance by a variety of means to a
large number of individuals priced out of the market for legal
services. The point of this Article is to argue that any system
meeting important goals of equality, effectiveness, and efficiency
will also provide assistance in a few other areas: (1) exploring legal
116. Samuel Goldwyn said, "A verbal contract isn't worth the paper it's written on." Id. at
317.
117. Bellow, supra note 45, at 106, 121-22.
118. One of the most effective lawyers I know represented his first clients as a student in a
law school clinic. In representing consumers who had been wronged, he found it effective to
explain to the opposing attorney, "We're not sure we want to settle. I can get extra credit if I can
figure out how to make this a class action."
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solutions where they are not immediately apparent; (2) overcoming
obstacles to collective and collaborative action when necessary; and
(3) attending to the longer-term consequences of larger efforts at
problem solving.
Agreeing on these goals and the design features of a system of
providing access to justice does not predetermine how those goals
should be achieved. To the extent that poor people now have access
to affirmative representation, such representation is provided through
a variety of means, including (1) the plaintiffs' class action bar in a
limited number of areas; (2) private civil rights firms that survive
primarily on the proceeds of fee-shifting statutes; (3) a relatively
small minority of legal services lawyers whose caseloads include
such representation; (4) an increasing number of pro bono lawyers
who have decided with their firms that solving problems on a large
scale, just as they do for their business clients, is a better use of their
skills; and (5) the occasional law school clinic. In working toward a
better system, we should contemplate how to strengthen the efforts in
all of these areas. On the other hand, we should not regard a system
that has evolved through necessity and bricolage as relieving a
government of laws of its obligation to see that everyone within its
jurisdiction has reasonably equal access to the benefits and
protection of those laws.
